To further change the geopolitical dynamics of the region and to impact the position of the Islamic Republic, the next logical geographical target could be pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Such a large-scale operation would require significant resources, and Tehran is well-prepared to counter with massive force and its robust Shia base in Iraq, where its readiness surpasses any other regional stronghold. Consequently, the next confrontation with Iran may not unfold in the Middle East but in an unexpected theater: the South Caucasus.
Why the South Caucasus?
Iran is less likely to anticipate an attack from this direction. Tehran’s current priorities include safeguarding the Axis of Resistance from collapse, strengthening its foothold in Iraq, and advancing its nuclear program as a cornerstone of its security strategy. In contrast, the South Caucasus is less prominent in Iran’s strategic calculations. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War is a notable example of how unexpected developments in this region can shift the balance of power, compelling Iran to react defensively. A similar unanticipated conflict could arise in the future.
Second, one consequence of recent developments in the Middle East is Iran’s separation from its partners. The fall of Syria would limit Tehran’s ability to maintain connections with Hezbollah and reach the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey would likely dominate communication networks, creating a web of dependency for regional and global actors. Ankara and Baku are pursuing a similar strategy in the South Caucasus - cutting Iran’s access to the Black Sea and Russia by undermining or collapsing Armenia. This would leave Iran’s connections to Europe and Russia entirely dependent on Baku and Ankara.
Third, the South Caucasus represents a critical intersection of interests for Turkey, Israel, and the United States. These three external actors, all of whom stand to benefit from the fall of Assad in Syria, share an interest in weakening Iran. While bilateral disagreements over local issues persist, they are overshadowed by broader regional objectives.
It is worth noting that Iran has often acted indirectly in Syria and other regions, using supportive forces as “battering rams” on the ground. In Syria, similarforces include armed opposition groups and terrorist organizations are supported by Turkey, Israel, and other nations. In the South Caucasus, Baku plays a comparable role.
What could happen?
The most plausible scenario for a strike against Iran involves opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia’s Syunik or a direct strike on Armenia. This scenario is significant for two reasons. First, such an operation would avoid a confrontation with Iran, reducing the likelihood of an immediate response from Tehran. As in Syria, Iran’s ability to act would be constrained by the fact that the events are unfolding in another country outside its immediate territory.
Second, the opening of the corridor could be executed as a rapid military operation, similar to past actions in Syria. The primary objective would be to inflict maximum damage on Armenia while preventing it from mounting prolonged resistance. Such an operation would likely involve concentrated forces and resources to ensure its completion within a matter of days, minimizing the time available for external actors to respond. Precedents already exist: in September 2023, an offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh was completed in less than a day, while a similar operation in Syria in November 2024 further emboldened Ankara.
This strategy could involve two key objectives. The minimum goal would be to open the “Zangezur corridor,” while the maximum goal would be to establish “Western Azerbaijan” on Armenian territory. President Ilham Aliyev’s ultimatum underscores this ambition, demanding that Armenia enter negotiations with the so-called “Western Azerbaijan Community.” From Armenia's perspective, such statements amount to territorial claims against the entire country, presenting its sovereign territory under the contrived label of “Western Azerbaijan.”
How are Baku and Ankara preparing?
Active preparations are underway to create the conditions necessary for a potential offensive. These efforts are focused on several critical tasks, without which any military escalation risks ineffectiveness or unintended consequences.
First, de-escalating Iran’s concerns: Baku is working to lower Tehran’s alertness. President Ilham Aliyev has sought to demonstrate a neutral or positive stance toward Iran. His meeting with the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was a notable gesture. Joint military exercises between Iran and Azerbaijan, including those involving the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), have been conducted in the past year. These actions will likely signal that any future activity by Azerbaijan is not directed against Iranian interests.
Second, shaping public opinion: Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media has been preparing the public for the possibility of a new military confrontation. Discussions of a potential “military operation in Zangezur” are increasingly prominent, with reports outlining its purported rationale, objectives, and scenarios. Following the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Baku appears to justify a potential new conflict with its population by framing it as a defensive measure. Propaganda claims that Armenia is preparing for war, although there is little evidence to support this assertion. Armenia, in reality, is not equipped for such a conflict.
Third, reinforcing military readiness: Azerbaijan is intensively training its armed forces. This includes joint exercises with Turkey and Pakistan and independent tactical drills. Recent commando exercises, designed with Turkish assistance, focused on offensive maneuvers such as launching sudden attacks on enemy positions. Simultaneously, Baku has accelerated its arms acquisitions from Israel, with recent shipments reaching record levels. Some of these weapons have been transferred to Nakhchivan, further enhancing strategic capabilities.
Fourth, strengthening alliances: Strengthening diplomatic and military alliances remains a key component of Baku’s strategy. The main role in Baku's military power is played by Turkey. In recent months, we can observe a high activity of meetings at the military level. For example, recently Azerbaijani delegation headed by the commander of the army in Nakhchivan met with the commander of the Ground Forces of the Turkish Armed Forces. In addition to its close ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan views Israel as a strategic partner. Following the fall of Assad, Azerbaijan’s presidential assistant Hikmet Hajiyev met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to align regional interests between Israel and Turkey. President Aliyev has also hosted leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel’s leading lobbying group in the United States. Concurrently, Azerbaijan has intensified its political dialogue with NATO, with regional security prominently featured in discussions.
Baku’s opportunity to launch an attack is unlikely to close soon, and it may even expand if the next US president adopts a more aggressive approach toward Iran and Russia. In such a scenario, Ankara’s strategic importance to Washington as a lever against Tehran and Moscow would grow.
Turkey, facing increased geopolitical opportunities, has two potential directions for expanding its influence: Iraq and the South Caucasus. However, while Ankara may prioritize Iraq, Baku is poised to take the lead in advancing Turkish interests in the South Caucasus.
Possible options for Iran
Iran can take preventive steps to mitigate the possibility of a potential escalation in the South Caucasus. Three main steps can be outlined.
First, conducting military exercises on the northern border. Iran's military activity on its territory in September 2022: Azerbaijan was preparing larger attacks when it struck Armenia, and Iranian actions helped prevent further escalation. This tool can once again demonstrate Iran's determination and readiness to defend its interests along the borders, despite the changing situation in the Middle East.
Second, Tehran may initiate an urgent meeting in the 3+3 format to discuss the situation in the South Caucasus, taking into account possible negative trends. This would localize the problem within the region, mitigating the risk of spillover of instability.
Third, to limit the use of force by Baku and its allies, Iran may increase its diplomatic activity in Syunik and other regions of Armenia that may be under attack. This activity could be multilateral, involving other states interested in preserving Armenia's territorial integrity and the status quo in the region.
*Sergei Melkonian is a Research Fellow at APRI Armenia, focusing on Russia and Iran. He is also a visiting professor at Yerevan State University. Before joining APRI, he served as an Assistant to the President of Armenia from 2020 to 2022, covering post-Soviet countries and the Middle East.
**Views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent those of the IRNA.
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